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Herman v. State, 122 Nev. Adv. Op. 17 (February 23, 2006)1
CRIMINAL LAW – DNA EVIDENCE
& PRESENTENCE REPORTS
Summary
In this case, the Court considered two issues: (1) whether DNA evidence
voluntarily submitted to a public facility to absolve a defendant of a crime may be used in
an unrelated criminal prosecution, and (2) whether reading a presentence report to a jury
during the sentencing phase is error when the report cannot be made part of the public
record.
Disposition/Outcome
The Court concluded (1) that the DNA evidence was properly admitted; and (2)
that the presentence report was improperly read to the jury. The Court affirmed the
defendant’s conviction, but reversed and remanded for a new sentencing phase.
Factual and Procedural History
In 1997, Leslie Carter was found dead in a women’s bathroom in Reno. Carter’s
body was partially undressed and her injuries indicated a violent struggle. Authorities
found blood that was not Carter’s in the bathroom and on the victim’s pants. Investigators
tested the blood for a DNA match, but none was found.
In 1999, Willie Herman was charged with robbery, and voluntarily submitted a
blood sample to help prove his innocence. Herman was acquitted. Authorities entered
Herman’s DNA results into a criminal database without Herman’s knowledge or
permission.
In 2000, authorities retested the blood found on Carter’s pants. It matched
Herman’s DNA profile. In 2000 and 2001, detectives interviewed Herman three times in
Lovelock Correctional Center, where Herman was incarcerated for possession of a
controlled substance. When detectives met with Herman for the final time in October
2001, Herman volunteered, without being questioned, that he had not raped or killed
Carter. Herman was charged with first-degree murder.
During Herman’s trial, two of Herman’s former cellmates testified that Herman
confessed to killing Carter. During closing arguments, the prosecutor indicated that
Herman’s statement to detectives that he did not rape or kill Carter contained information
about the crime not available to the general public, since it was not publicly known that
Carter had been sexually assaulted. The prosecutor also stated that Herman could not
explain how his blood was found at the crime scene. The jury convicted Herman.
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During the sentencing phase, the State read to the jury a presentence report that
detailed Herman’s multiple prior arrests. The jury sentenced Herman to life without the
possibility of parole. Herman appealed.
Discussion
A. DNA Evidence
Herman argued that the DNA evidence from his previous robbery trial was
inadmissible at his murder trial. Because Herman failed to raise the issue during trial, the
Court was limited to addressing plain error.2 The Court found no plain error.
Both the United States and Nevada Constitutions prohibit unreasonable search
and seizure.3 Warrantless searches are generally unreasonable, but consent exempts a
search from probable cause and warrant requirements.4 The state must prove consent by
clear and persuasive evidence.5
The Court found support for the position that when an individual consents to
provide or voluntarily provides a DNA sample to authorities, there is no Fourth
Amendment violation when that DNA sample is later used in an unrelated proceeding.6
The Court then reviewed cases decided by the Supreme Courts of Indiana7 and
Hawaii,8 which held that an individual has no possessory or privacy interest in his DNA
sample when it is placed in a state database. The Court found substantial support for the
position that a defendant has no expectation of privacy when he volunteers his DNA
sample without limiting the scope of his consent.9 The Court measures the scope of a
defendant’s consent by applying a reasonable person standard to determine whether the
legitimately obtained DNA sample may, like fingerprints, be used for general
investigative purposes.
The Court held that Herman provided his DNA sample without limiting the scope
of his consent. A reasonable person in Herman’s position would have known that the
DNA sample he gave to prove his innocence and the resulting DNA profile would be
available for general investigative purposes. Thus, there was no plain error in admitting
evidence of Herman’s DNA sample.
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Sterling v. State, 108 Nev. 391, 394, 834 P.2d 400, 402 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. § 178.602 (2005).
U.S. CONST. amend. IV; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 18.
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Howe v. State, 112 Nev. 458, 463, 916 P.2d 153, 157 (1996).
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Lightford v. State, 90 Nev. 136, 139, 520 P.2d 955, 956 (1974).
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Smith v. State, 744 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2001).
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Id. In Smith, the defendant moved to suppress DNA evidence obtained in a previous case. In the previous
case, the court had ordered the defendant to provide a DNA sample, from which a DNA profile was
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it. Id.
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State v. McCord, 562 S.E.2d 689, 693 (S.C. Ct. App. 2002).
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B. Presentence Report
Herman argued that it was error to allow the prosecution to read the presentence
report to the sentencing jury. Because Herman did not raise the issue below, the Court
only addressed plain error and constitutional error sua sponte.10
To warrant a new sentencing hearing based on an alleged due process violation, a
defendant must show actual prejudice.11
During a sentencing proceeding, the court may consider facts and circumstances
that would be inadmissible at trial.12
The district court is afforded wide discretion in its sentencing decisions and the
Nevada Supreme Court refrains from interfering with the sentence imposed when the
record does not show prejudice resulting from the admission of information founded on
facts supported only by impalpable or highly suspect evidence.”13 NRS 175.552(3)
permits evidence of any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, regardless of
the inadmissibility of that evidence at trial. However, there are constitutional constraints
on the court’s discretion.
In the penalty phase of a capital case, evidence of the defendant's character and
specific instances of conduct are admissible, but the evidence must be relevant and the
danger of unfair prejudice must not substantially outweigh its probative value.14
Pursuant to NRS 176.156, a presentence report is to be presented to both the
defense and the prosecution, who each may object to any factual errors in the report. The
report is confidential and is not to be made part of the public record.15
Here, the prosecution read the presentence report to the jury, including a
description of seventeen previous unrelated arrests. The Court held that the reading of
the presentence report to the jury was tantamount to making it part of the public record.
Additionally, the Court found that some of the information contained in the sentencing
report, including Herman’s arrest for possession of paraphernalia, was clearly not more
probative than it was prejudicial with respect to Herman’s violent character and capacity
to kill. Therefore, the Court concluded that it was plain error to allow the prosecution to
read the presentence report to the jury, and for a new sentencing proceeding.
Conclusion
The Court held that it was not plain error to admit Herman’s DNA information at
trial. A person who volunteers DNA information for public use without expressly
limiting the scope of his consent has no expectation of privacy in his DNA profile.
Additionally, the Court held that it was plain error to allow the presentence report to be
read to the jury. The Court remanded to the district court for a new sentencing phase.
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